Who is to blame? The player or the rules of the game? by Kaleng'A, Wisdom Chilwizhi
  
Lund University Master of Science in  
International Development and Management 
June, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Who is to blame? The players or the rules of the game? 
Performance constraints among local value-adding firms supplying to mining 
MNCs in Zambia’s liberalized economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author: Wisdom C. Kaleng’a 
             Supervisor: Turaj Faran 
1 
Abstract  
 
Why the performance of local value-adding firms supplying to mining MNCs in Zambia’s 
liberalized economy seems more constrained was the investigated problem. I conducted a multiple 
case study research involving 15 firms located on Copperbelt Province. Local value-adding firms 
are cardinal to national industrial development through their backward linkage role to mines. 
However, their performance is more constrained partly because of their weak internal capabilities. 
The real constraint for their situation lies in the “rules of the game” of supplying to mining MNCs 
which are externally engineered and applied by mining companies. Mining MNCs have absolute 
power to determine who supplies, what is supplied, what price and extent to which supplies are 
made whilst government acts like a spectator unlike a referee. Government’s inactivity emanates 
from institutional changes birthed by the 1991 economic liberalization. Addressing the firms’ 
situation neither lies in “doing business as usual” where mining MNCs remain more powerful nor 
in government fully regulating the relationship between local suppliers and mining companies. 
What could work is a holistic “change of the rules of the game” through government’s actively 
engaging stakeholders and appropriately incentivizing each category to subsequently strengthen the 
procurement and supplying relationship between mines and local suppliers.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research problem, purpose and question 
Through linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic enterprises, TNC participation 
may play a catalytic role in the development of related industries (WIR01) and, under 
certain conditions, of an extractive industry cluster. Linkages can take place along and 
beyond the extractive-industry value chain. Backward linkages occur when foreign 
affiliates acquire inputs (goods and services) from local suppliers...Linkages can be 
developed with domestic firms or with other foreign affiliates in the host country 
(UNCTAD, 2007: 140).   
 
The two questions which instantly made me curious when I read the above quote in UNCTAD’s 
2007 World Investment Report (WIR) were: does this, especially the backward linkages, happen in 
my own country Zambia whose economy is copper-based and has had TNCs
1
 influx since economic 
liberalization in 1991? And, if so, how does it influence local firms’ performance? The equally 
immediate response on the backward linkages from local suppliers to MNCs-owned mines was in 
the affirmative. The next question required a review of literature and further investigation. I 
analytically read the 2007 WIR after receiving an invitation to align my thesis research to an 
academic research project seeking to address a similar objective nascent in its title - the 2012 to 
2016 Successful African Firms and Institutional Change (SAFIC) project
2
.  
 
This background became the entry point into my LUMID research on local firms. Moreover, it is 
argued that “why businesses succeed or fail continues to be a topic of popular as well as research 
interest” (Yin, 2009: 142). The generally held view remains that: 
The fortunes of Zambian businesses have ebbed and flowed with the political and 
economic policies of the country, and with changes in the world copper market. Key 
events include independence from Britain in 1964, widespread nationalization in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, and market liberalization in the early 1990s…Many of the large 
conglomerates have evolved from small-scale family businesses, often started by 
entrepreneurs of foreign origin– mainly Indian and European – who have since become 
Zambian citizens (Sutton & Langmead, 2013: 13).     
 
                                                 
1
 transnational corporations also called and hereafter referred to as MNCs – multinational corporations 
2
 It involves the Copenhagen Business School’s (CBS) Centre for Business Development Studies (CBDS), Roskilde 
University and The University of Zambia’s (UNZA) Department of Geography and Environmental Studies among other 
partner universities in Kenya and Tanzania. The Zambian component of the project focuses on local suppliers in the 
agricultural and mining sectors as the following link details: http://www.cbs.dk/forskning/forskningsprojekter/successful-
african-firms-and-institutional-change, accessed in 2012 and 2013 
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My research’s point of departure became the 1991 economic liberalization and its impact on the 
performance of local value-adding firms supplying to MNCs owned mines. Therefore, the purpose 
was to investigate why the performance of local value-adding firms supplying to mining MNCs in 
Zambia’s liberalized economy seems more constrained. The main research question was why does 
the performance of local value-adding firms supplying to mining MNCs seem more constrained in 
Zambia’s liberalized economy?  The following were the sub-questions:   
1. What major institutional changes have impacted the performance of local value-adding firms 
supplying to the mines in Zambia’s liberalized economy? 
2. What are the sources, if any, of improved performance among local value-adding firms 
supplying to the mines? 
3. How can the firms’ performance enhancing factors be harnessed and constraining factors 
eliminated?  
1.2 Research significance and concepts 
Local enterprises supplying to MNCs-owned mines in Zambia could be vital to national industrial 
development given the centrality of mining to the less-diversified economy. However, it should be 
acknowledged that industrial and manufacturing diversification efforts have been made but no major 
break away from the reliance on copper has been witnessed. Zambia still ranks highly, seventh in 
2012, among global copper producers and hosts some of the world giant mining MNCs such as 
Barrick Gold, Vedanta Resources and Glencore (E & MJ, 2012: 130).    
 
Linking mining MNCs and suppliers largely arises from the complex minerals’ production 
processes requiring diverse inputs at different levels such as exploration, plant construction, ore 
extraction, transportation, processing and recycling of scrap metals (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001:4-6; 
Bridge, 2008:397/9). At every level, many opportunities arise for supplier firms - foreign or local - 
to provide appropriate services and/or goods relative to their capacities. Most big suppliers with 
immense capacity like Sandvic and Atlas Corpco, are equally MNCs whose subsidiaries are 
registered locally and have offices within Zambia. Such MNCs thus manufacture most needed 
products from wherever it is cost-effective to do so making them have unchallenged competitive 
advantage to supply to mining companies. Moreover, their strong financial endowments enable 
them to supply highly specialized equipment and services. As for local suppliers, their activities are 
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largely domestic even if they procure some inputs and products from abroad. Their manufacturing 
or value-adding activities therefore potentially provide good backward linkages to mining MNCs 
with possible tangible spillover effects on national industrial development.    
 
In this thesis, the studied local supplier firms are the value-adding ones given their perceived and 
actual contribution to industrial development. Suppliers are categorized into two: “value-adding” or 
manufacturing suppliers; and traders (non-value adding). Both supply to mines but from different 
positions. The value-adding ones are those manufacturing and supplying goods or supply, for 
instance, civil engineering services. These are crucial products to the mines’ actual production and 
operations. The trading firms are usually viewed as some kind of:   
import agents, generally operating on an ad hoc basis, without formal, established premises. 
Rather than developing technical competencies or specializing, these “briefcase 
businessmen” lobbied governments and developed social networks within the mining 
companies to secure orders. With low overhead costs, their transactions were highly 
profitable and displaced established suppliers (Fessehaie, 2012: 446).   
 
The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) in recent years has also recognized value-adding 
firms’ role in national development. For example, in its Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), 
government envisaged developing “an open, competitive, dynamic, and sustainable manufacturing 
sector that is driven by the private sector, with emphasis on upstream and downstream 
manufacturing activities based on the mining and agro-industry sub-sectors” (GRZ, 2006: 116).  
 
It is in this regard that the performance of local value-adding suppliers in a liberalized economy 
involved in myriad downstream activities as backward linkages to mines was academically 
interesting and relevant to study. Moreover, improved performance of local value-adding suppliers, 
all things being equal, has strong effects on subsequent re-investments and retention of profits 
generated within an economy. Such firms help to harvest some benefits of globalization from the 
mining MNCs through technological acquisition which also builds their capacity. Employment 
creation and income distribution opportunities are also created to broadly enhance poverty reduction 
among other spillover effects (Blomström & Sjöholm 1999:916).  
 
Localness of firms was difficult to define because some respondents did not clearly disclose the 
ownership of the firms. Therefore, I purposively settled on firms whose ownership was clearly 
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revealed to be absolutely in indigenous Zambians’ hands either as families, business partners or 
individual proprietors. Other firms were thus treated as informants to triangulate views from the 
targeted firms. As detailed later in the theoretical framework, performance was understood and 
assessed through three broad indicators: resources; output; and flexibility. 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Having introduced the investigated research problem in section 1, section 2 provides a background 
on mining and liberalization in Zambia. This is followed by literature review and methodology as 
sections 3 and 4 respectively. The theoretical framework is the fifth section which is followed by the 
presentation and analysis of results as the sixth section. To conclude in section 7, a question about 
who to apportion the blame on for why local value-adding firms are more constrained is posed and 
answered.  
 
2 BACKGROUND: MINING AND LIBERALIZATION IN ZAMBIA 
Zambia traditionally exports minerals since its founding in 1964 when it gained independence from 
Britain. The most significant mineral exported has been, and still is, copper which has ordinarily 
been mined on the Copperbelt Province. Since 2004 however, there has been increased MNCs 
investments and mining activities in North Western province which lies next to and in the western 
part of Copperbelt (GRZ, 2006; Negi, 2010:209). 
 
Increased visibility of indigenous entrepreneurs engaging in free and private enterprise supplying to 
mines could be said to have occurred alongside FDI increase in Zambia’s mining sector since the 
1990s. In 1991, there was a remarkable return to multiparty democracy in which Frederick 
Chiluba’s MMD party defeated Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP which was the only party (and its 
president) ruling the country for 27 years since independence. Chiluba professed consolidating 
liberal democracy and widespread economic liberalization (Burnell, 2001: 95).  
 
Before large-scale economic liberalization, Zambia inherited a private sector-led economy at 
independence but later opted for “Zambianization” initiated by the 1968 and 1969 Mulungushi and 
Matero reforms, respectively, enacted by parliament. As the trend was for most newly independent 
states in Africa which embraced Socialism, Zambia Zambianized or nationalized to transfer the 
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foreign-owned mines and other major enterprises into state hands hence the name 
“Zambianization”.  Zambianization also meant “the progressive replacement of British and other 
expatriates by indigenous Zambians” (Negi, 2011: 28). Therefore, the state acquired 51% shares in 
all mines previously privately owned by the Roan Selection Trust (RST) and Anglo-American 
Corporation (AAC). It was hoped that Zambianization would yield significant benefits by 
channeling profits towards socio-economic development. At that time, copper mining accounted for 
over 80% of the country’s export earnings and a source of about 50% government revenue (Lungu, 
2008: 404; Simutanyi, 2008: 1).  
 
To secure these benefits, government merged the mining companies to form the Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in 1982. This initiative helped government to construct 
schools, hospitals and provide other services including subsidizing state-owned companies involved 
in manufacturing. Consequently, a local supply cluster meant to diversify flourishing manufacturing 
activities through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and some smaller private firms by some Zambians 
and foreign entrepreneurs was established (Fessehaie, 2012: 445; Lungu, 2008: 404; Simutanyi, 
2008: 1). 
 
Despite these successes, more challenges emerged. Plummeting copper prices and the first and 
second oil crises in 1974 and 1979, respectively, culminating into a foreign debt crisis slowed-down 
the country’s development process. Overall, “for twenty years, the economy collapsed at an 
internationally unprecedented rate as copper prices fell relative to the prices of imports” (Lungu, 
2008: 405). All these factors crippled ZCCM such that it could no longer effectively develop the 
local supply chain. Besides, suppliers usually lacked necessary technical capacities to efficiently 
produce quality goods and services. Other inadequacies included lower competitive levels and frail 
R&D capabilities. Notwithstanding these inefficiencies, ZCCM was mandated to embrace local 
suppliers especially that it also lacked foreign exchange to procure internationally (Fessehaie, 2012: 
445).    
 
Throughout the nationalization process and economic decline, the private sector was insignificantly 
in the picture. Actually, it is argued that the state further stifled private sector participation by 
forcefully introducing extensive control mechanisms, licensing procedures and taxes. This meant 
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the lean foreign entrepreneurs-dominated private sector equally became inefficient. As for the 
public sector, Zambianization further dampened the inefficiencies. Many people so long as they 
were Zambian even if they lacked the right set of qualifications, skills and experience were 
appointed to key positions ordinarily requiring high managerial skills (Gulhati, 1991: 242).   
 
To ameliorate these challenges, Zambia in the late 1980s unsuccessfully attempted to implement the 
IMF backed SAPs which included economic liberalization (Simutanyi, 2008: 1-2). Coupled with the 
prolonged socio-economic malaise, widespread discontent among people was generated leading to 
UNIP government’s defeat by Chiluba’s MMD in 1991 to return to neo-liberal tenets and market 
economics. Consequently, Zambia passed the Privatization Act in 1992 and the Mines and Minerals 
Act in 1995. These established the base for privatizing ZCCM in 1996 to finally unleash the much 
constrained private and free enterprise. MNCs and FDI begun triumphantly flowing into Zambia 
after ZCCM was sold to seven, mainly Western, MNCs (Lungu, 2008: 405, 407).     
 
During Chiluba’s 10 years in office as president, privatization of SOEs moved from the drawing 
board to the actual increase in MNCs penetration in the mining and other sectors. This momentum 
continued even after Chiluba left office such that copper production and exports considerably grew 
due to FDI which revitalized the economy’s backbone. For example, copper and cobalt exports 
accounted for approximately four fifth of total exports in 2006 at USD 3.2 billion (UNCTAD, 2007: 
136). Overall, Zambia’s copper exports rose from about USD 474 million to about USD 4 billion 
during the 2000 to 2008 peak period until the global economic crisis briefly reduced the earnings to 
about USD3.17 billion in 2009 (Fessehaie, 2012: 445). It is against this background that the private 
sector, narrowed-down to local value-adding suppliers dealing with mining conglomerates, in 
Zambia was investigated and is discussed in this thesis.   
3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Liberalization as ingredient for firms’ improved performance 
Discussing how liberalization would ensure the private sector in a developing country’s economy 
contributes to industrial development through backward linkages to MNCs has existed for many 
decades now. For example, in 1981 the World Bank’s publication of the most influential Berg 
Report is arguably the genesis of standard interpretation of value-adding firms in Africa (Arrighi, 
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2002:7). In the Berg Report, Africa’s “bad policies” beside “bad governance” were blamed for 
heavily protecting local manufacturing industries thus inhibiting firms’ performance and overall 
being responsible for the African crisis. Some recommendations were that there should be reduced 
protection of industries, relaxation of import restrictions and less direct control by government 
(World Bank, 1981: 29-31, 96; Bigsten & Söderbom, 2005: 2). Generally, replacing public with 
private enterprise was a strongly recommended option. Similarly in the same year, 1981, another 
influential scholar - Robert Bates - authored the Markets and States in Tropical Africa in which he 
contended (as one of the “good policies”) that state power must be dismantled to leave the infant 
manufacturing firms with freedom to identify and maximize market opportunities (Arrighi, 2002:7). 
  
Furthermore, it is argued that when MNCs are allowed into an economy they will contribute to 
industrial development. This is because they are viewed not only to create employment and 
maximize the cheap labour available in a developing country but also help the economy gainfully 
exploit its natural resources and harvest other benefits from globalization. In this process, the MNCs 
will inevitably and increasingly subcontract to local firms. In this sense, most previously state-
dominated economies in developing countries implemented neo-liberal policies to enable MNCs’ 
entry (Hilhorst, 1998:11). Additionally, with an open market, local firms are more likely to have 
their efficiency standards on supplies to MNCs or exports improved; and enabled to import cheaper 
inputs and products (World Bank, 2008: 7). Zambia is located within this general argument. It is a 
“good case” of liberalization since the early 1990s where mining MNCs, at least in theory, have 
been envisaged to necessitate improved value-adding firms’ performance; and help the country 
industrialize through the creation of linkages.    
 
3.2 Firms’ internal factors - liberalized external environment nexus  
Although it appears much empirical evidence on local value-adding firms’ performance in Zambia 
is lacking, for more than two decades now, several large-scale surveys on manufacturing firms 
across Africa have been conducted on a two-fold rationale: to try and establish what has gone wrong 
in this sector; and devise remedial measures. The findings have been that much of Africa’s, Zambia 
included, manufacturing sector remains small and largely so stagnant that there has not been a 
breakthrough (Bigsten & Söderbom, 2005: 1-2).  
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The World Bank in 2002 started conducting the Enterprise Survey in some countries globally 
including Zambia. This firm-level survey focuses on improving the business environment in those 
countries within which the firms operate (World Bank, 2008: 1). This and many other surveys have 
addressed issues pertinent to different firms but have not significantly explored the development of 
local value-chains (Fessehaie, 2012: 444). This thesis does not extensively explore the mining local 
value-chain either but attempts to add to the currently lean stock of knowledge on the subject by 
investigating why local-value adding firms in Zambia’s mining sector face constraints to achieving 
improved performance.     
 
Empirical evidence shows firms’ performance being constrained by factors categorized into two. On 
one hand, factors internal to the firm such as capital outlay available to the firm or its ability to 
acquire credit; the extent to which entrepreneurs and workers in the firm are educated or skilled; and 
how the firm is organized to conduct business efficiently and profitably are recognizable. On the 
other hand, external factors such as physical infrastructure availability and institutional 
environments surrounding the firms hold (Clarke, 2012:5).  
 
Fewer local firms that hailed from Zambia’s pre-liberalization era had fragmented capacity to match 
the emerging competition. Emerging entrepreneurs also lacked substantial skills, experience and 
financial capacity to position themselves well into the rapidly burgeoning market. Additionally, the 
MNCs which bought the mines introduced new and higher standards that supplier firms must 
observe. Consequently, local value-adding firms were exposed to stiff competition from the better 
capacity-endowed foreign suppliers on one hand and local trading supplier firms on the other hand 
(Fessehaie, 2012: 445). Moreover, both old and new entrants tend to fail to establish market niches 
for them to stand out and minimize stiffer competition (Hilhorst, 1998:13).  
 
Mining MNCs are also accused of relying on local-based foreign supplier firms for the bulk of local 
procurements (Fessehaie, 2011; Hanlin, 2011:5). These foreign supplier firms, which include 
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) such as Sandvik and Atlas Corpco locally stock most 
supplies such as heavy machinery from their parent companies based, for example, in Canada, 
Europe, USA and Australia. Hence, such companies dominate the supply chain thereby greatly 
obscuring local firms’ visibility (Fessehaie, 2011). The foreign supplier firms further consolidate 
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their grip by providing after-sale services through their locally registered offices situated within 
close proximity to the mines (E & MJ, 2011: 59; Fessehaie, 2012: 446/8).   
 
Figure 1: Example of Capacity Endowed Foreign Firms 
 
Source: Author’s 
 
This illustrates concerns about the extent to which MNCs’ entry has on local firms and the economy 
in general. While it is true that multiple beneficial spillover effects arise from MNCs investments in 
a host country, such spillovers in a sector like Zambia’s mining industry are neither automatic nor 
guaranteed. The economy and industry hosting the MNCs need to have institutional environments 
and absorption capacities that support the harvesting of such spillovers. One such feature should be 
the existence of a narrower technological gap between the MNCs and local firms to ensure the 
learning scope between them is mutually beneficial (Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999: 916; Bastholm & 
Kragelund, 2009: 118). 
 
This imbalance in capacity endowments seems to have made most local players in Zambia having a 
distant participative role. For example, according to Fessehaie (2012), local value-adding suppliers 
registered with the mining MNCs in 2009 ranged between 150 and 200 whereas the bulk of the local 
suppliers estimated at about 5000 were into the non-value-adding category. The value-adding 
category requires skills and capital intensity. Conversely, the other category’s huge number of 
suppliers is attributed to lower entry and exit barriers. Such a scenario constrains developing the 
former category (Fessehaie, 2012: 446).  
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The prevailing situation is also associated to institutional and policy sides of extractive economies. 
Mining MNCs do not operate as an island for them to be entirely blamed for the constraints local 
suppliers face (Morris et al, 2011: 3). Others include bank financial institutions and government; 
with government inevitably having the overarching mandate over all stakeholders. After its 
liberalization policies in the early 1990s, government abandoned interventionist policies making 
local firms face the overwhelming competition unaided. No major government policies and 
initiatives were developed to address this dynamic challenging environment until the early 2000s. 
The 1995 Mines and Minerals Act as the mines privatization framework could have been the first 
remedial measure had its non-binding provisions for local supply chain development been observed. 
The mining MNCs and government were not preoccupied with the implementation of these 
provisions. Government at that time is particularly blamed for lacking political will to promote 
backward linkages as such linkages were regarded marginally significant (Fessehaie, 2012: 445/6).  
 
Soon after Levy Mwanawasa became the new MMD and Republican President in 2002, succeeding 
Fredrick Chiluba, he re-introduced national development planning following the recognition that: 
From independence in 1964, three national development plans were implemented. The 
Fourth National Development Plan was launched in 1989 but later abandoned in 1991 in 
preference for an open market system that brought momentous changes to our country. 
One of the important lessons learnt from the 1990s was the realization that even in a 
liberalized economy, development planning is necessary for guiding priority setting and 
resource allocation (GRZ, 2006: i).  
 
Therefore, the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 2002 – 2005 was established to 
pave way for subsequent five-year national plans to feed into the country’s realization of her 
overarching “Vision 2030” which aims specifically to “improve the investment climate and boost 
the private sector’s contribution to economic growth” (OECD, 2012: 20); and broadly making 
Zambia “a prosperous and middle-income nation by 2030” (GRZ, 2011: xii). The FNDP 2006-2010 
followed. Currently, the country is implementing the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 
2011-2015. It has to be noted here that much of the SNDP is being implemented by a different 
government - 2011 September to 2016 Michael Sata led government - whose Patriotic Front 
political party ideals are different from those of the MMD.  
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Within these broad-based initiatives, supporting policies and strategies for specific sectors such as 
mining and manufacturing have been designed. Government acknowledges that “the manufacturing 
sector is a pivot of economic growth through its backward and forward linkages to economic 
growth, exports and employment creation” (GRZ, 2011: 133). Recognition is evident and good but 
what is lacking is establishing and prioritizing implementation of initiatives targeting the firms in 
context. Where manufacturing is stressed, it could be that the focus on export markets overshadows 
the firms’ potential backward linkage role in the local market with the mining MNCs. For example, 
the first objective in the 2007 Commerce, Trade and Industrial Policy is about stimulating and 
encouraging “value-addition activities on primary exports” (GRZ, 2007: 13). Local firms are 
broadly included in the seventh objective which seeks to help them “increase their levels of 
efficiency and competitiveness, and therefore withstand competition in domestic and international 
markets” (GRZ, 2007: 13).   
 
This thesis is not an evaluation of all national development plans, policies and/or initiatives but an 
analysis of local value-adding firms surrounded by the country’s myriad national development plans 
and policies; and by the mining MNCs and banks. Therefore, the findings are analyzed through 
institutional change theory to address factors external to firms. The theory of the firm also helps to 
analyze the firms’ core capabilities (or lack of) which enhance or impede their performance in the 
changing liberalized environment. 
4 METHODOLOGY  
This section discusses the research approach and research design utilized in my fieldwork. Methods 
used to collect data and how generalizable or trustworthy the findings were are equally discussed. 
How data were transcribed and analyzed are other items highlighted after which limitations of the 
study and ethical considerations are presented.    
4.1 Research Approach 
The first thing to be resolved before my fieldwork was the research approach– whether deductive or 
inductive. Before commencing fieldwork, institutional theory potentially related to the investigation 
and analysis of the impact of liberalization on local firms. This in Bryman’s (2008) view, I was 
considering a deductive approach where based on my knowledge about the topic through literature 
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and general understanding about Zambia being my home country, I could deduce a hypothesis to be 
empirically tested. From the theory enriched hypothesis I could then have concepts translated into 
researchable questions. Nevertheless, the research purpose meant taking an inductive approach. 
 
Induction is whereby “the researcher infers the implications of his or her findings for the theory that 
prompted the whole exercise” (Bryman, 2008: 9). At the end of fieldwork, I inferred the findings to 
institutional theory (specifically institutional change theory) and observed that it was only adequate 
for analyzing factors external to the firms investigated. Therefore, I identified the theory of the firm 
to analyze factors internal to firms which made them either positively or negatively impacted by the 
external environment arising from liberalization. Ultimately, even if the research approach was 
inductive, some deductive elements were also present.  
4.2 Research Design 
I utilized a case study design in my fieldwork in anticipation of its logicality and sequential 
relationship between empirical data and my research question which kept being adjusted and 
consolidated during fieldwork (Yin, 2003: 44). Per definition, “[t]he essence of a case study, the 
central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of 
decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (Yin, 2009: 17).  
 
A case study may either be an individual, event, institution, organization, programme or an entire 
country among other cases (Gomm et al, 2007: 3; Yin, 2009: 17).  It is an in-depth investigation of 
fewer cases or often a single case. These features demarcating a case study however are not distinct 
to only such a design. For example, Gomm et al (2007) argues that an experiment may equally 
involve the investigation of one or fewer cases unlike a survey which I could have alternatively used 
in my research. The core focus of case studies however is on “cases of decisions” (Yin, 2009: 17). It 
is in this view that the research design was appropriate to investigate the topic where liberalization 
is basically a “decision” which was made in Zambia in 1991. Besides, as in Yin’s definition, the 
liberalization decision had a rationale and its implementation has had results on firms.   
 
Zambia’s Copperbelt Province was purposively selected as a case study physical location. The 
province was viewed as a bounded system whereby it was possible to locate firms as multiple cases 
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within it for a detailed study of the subject matter (Creswell, 2007: 73-4). Creswell (2007: 73) uses a 
“bounded system” to imply a context or setting. Hence, I considered the location hosting the firms 
as the context since the province hosts more mines than any other location in the country. Kitwe and 
Ndola towns were purposefully selected as case study towns given that the former is the commercial 
hub and the later an administrative capital for the province. These characteristics entailed the 
presence of many local suppliers within proximity.  
4.3 Methods  
Considering what data collection techniques should be employed in my research commenced with 
understanding what types of data and sources would help answer the research question. Both 
primary and secondary data were deemed crucial. There are six commonly used case study data 
sources: “documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations, 
and physical artifacts” (Yin, 2009: 101). Obviously, all these data sources have strengths and 
weaknesses. Despite their weaknesses, only three – documentation, interviews, and direct 
observations – were feasible sources in my research.  
 
Documentation as a secondary data source included government policy documents. These were used 
for the identification of relevant factors external to the firms which characterize the changing 
institutional environment posing opportunities and challenges to their performance. Articles, books 
and the internet were equally significant for a review of literature addressing the firms’ internal and 
external factors, and for a theoretical understanding. Overall, documentation was the major source 
for answering the first sub-research question.  
 
The main primary data sources were interviews with three types of respondents: central target were 
local value-adding firms; then some foreign or other firms and key informants from government 
were useful data-triangulation source besides the documentation. Overall, as Gomm et al (2000) 
argue, the case study design aided in collecting data through interviews linked to the research 
purpose and question investigated. Besides interviews, direct observations were made. All 
respondents from firms were interviewed at their offices usually located in Kitwe’s heavy industrial 
area and a few others in Ndola town. This was instrumental to learning what life is like for an 
“insider” while remaining, inevitably, an “outsider” (Mack et al, 2005: 13). It helped me to see 
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(and in some cases take photos) for example some metal fabrication workshops and the products the 
firms supply to the mines making such observations vital to analysis.  
 
Sampling firms and having access to the field was facilitated by the gatekeeper SAFIC project. The 
project was preparing to conduct a mapping exercise of local value-adding firms on the Copperbelt 
Province due to the lack of a comprehensive list from authorities such as ZACCI. Often, there is a 
warning that gatekeepers’ interests may conflict those of the researcher and the researched 
(Scheyvens & Storey, 2003: 153). Luckily for me, within the academic-oriented SAFIC project, I 
was funded to freely conduct my research whilst contributing to the mapping exercise.  
 
When I arrived in Lusaka Zambia at the beginning of November 2012, it was evident that entering 
the field and having access to respondents required my utilizing the project’s preliminary work. This 
then leads to how I sampled the firms. I commenced fieldwork by purposively utilizing the initial 
list of relevant firms my gatekeeper project had earlier contacted. Therefore, throughout fieldwork 
the number of firms grew such that some were not interviewed because a saturation point – where 
responses from next respondents do not seem to add new views to the already collected data - was 
reached. Through snowballing I asked the respondents to link me to others “who would be willing 
to discuss their experiences with me” (Bryman, 2004: 101). Some firms on the initial list suggested 
others I could interview. This means two sampling methods – purposive and snowballing – 
combined in the fieldwork.  
 
The reality on the ground however was not always as per the initial sample obtained through my 
gatekeeper. For example, the first firm I visited and understood to be locally owned turned out to be 
completely foreign owned. However, the introduction the respondent gave about himself as a 
Zambian and having worked in different firms on issues relevant to the research question made me 
continue with the interview using the interview guide initially meant only for local firms (later 
modified to make it appropriate for either type of firms – see appendix I). The only change however 
was to ask him questions as an expert or informant. In this sense he, and a few other cases where 
respondents could not provide clear details about the firm’s ownership, served as key informants in 
addition to government officials.  
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The total sampled local firms interviewed was therefore 15. Additionally, some government 
officials from the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development (MMMD) and Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI) were interviewed as key informants. The total number of 
interviews was therefore 24 as shown in figure 1(see also appendix III). From both the local and 
other firms, respondents were either proprietors (who in some cases serve as CEOs in their firms) or 
high ranking employees where a management structure existed in those firms.  
 
Figure 2: Number of Interviews per Respondents' Category 
 
Source: Author’s own based on field data 
 
Two semi-structured interview guides were initially developed - one targeting firms and another for 
key informants from government. Whereas the interview guide for firms got modified and utilized 
during fieldwork, the one for informants became irrelevant and was not used. Key informants were 
“pregnant” with information about the subject such that my self-introduction as a student researcher 
was adequate for lengthy unstructured interviews. The only roles I played were to probe and take 
notes since voice recording during interviews with government officials was not allowed.  
4.4 Generalization verses Trustworthiness of findings  
In a case study, “the main concern may be with understanding the case studied in itself, with no 
interest in theoretical inference or empirical generalization” (Gomm et al, 2007: 4). Since my 
research was anchored more on induction than deduction, theoretical inference and generalization of 
investigated cases to similar ones across Zambia was not a preoccupation. Nevertheless, it is also 
true that the analysis of collected data and review of policy documents among other documents 
shows a general picture in the country. Besides, firms narrated their own situation on the Copperbelt 
province but also analyzed the situation in mining and manufacturing sectors country-wide since 
most of them conduct business with mines located in other parts of the country. Moreover, the 
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experts from the foreign-owned firms and government officials gave a national perspective thus 
triangulated views from the targeted firms. Therefore, my focus was on maximizing the data-
enhancing attribute of qualitative research to enable clear links between main themes of the findings 
and how they relate to theory (Ragin, 1994 as cited in Mikkelsen, 2005: 141).   
 
This process made the data collection exercise and its aftermath strong ingredients for 
trustworthiness of the findings. Trustworthiness (similar to the concept of validity in quantitative 
research) in qualitative research denotes aspects such as: credibility which is about how believable 
the findings can be; transferability implying whether the findings can apply in other contexts; 
dependability (reliability in quantitative studies) is concerned with the likelihood of the findings 
being applicable at other times (Bryman, 2004: 30). Reliability, or dependability in this sense, arises 
from the demonstrated data-collection procedure as allowing the obtainment of same results and 
drawing similar conclusions if the procedure is repeated (Yin, 2009: 40). 
4.5 Data transcription and analysis  
During and after fieldwork I transcribed the interviews which, together with field notes, were the 
basis for analysis. Despite having a research assistant (largely responsible for logistical support) 
provided by my gatekeeper project, I personally conducted all interviews (except one) in English 
(Zambia’s official language) because all respondents spoke the language. Therefore, possible miss-
representation of views both during interviews and transcription was eliminated hence improving 
the findings’ reliability.  
 
The theoretical framework applied to the firm as the unit of analysis. Therefore, I organized and 
analyzed transcribed data according to theory-enriched themes meant to help answer the research 
question. Specifically, I applied content analysis to the transcribed text and reviewed literature. 
Content analysis broadly refers to “any technique for making inferences by systematic and objective 
identifying special characteristics of messages” (Berg, 1989: 106). My research question implied 
explaining some causal relationships about why the local firms’ performance is the way it is. 
Content analysis was then useful in what Yin (2009) refers to as explanation building - where some 
patterns in the data being analyzed are matched to help build an explanation about the case(s) in 
point.         
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4.6 Limitations and Ethical Considerations 
Being a multiple case study, the cases (firms) covered including the data from informants suggest 
sufficient data were collected. The time constraint however did not permit thorough triangulation of 
some views. A follow-up interview with one of the two government ministries would have been 
vital except it was not feasible given the lengthy procedure of getting permission for a formal 
interview. It has to be noted here that two of the government officials voluntarily offered to be 
informally interviewed in their individual capacities. This happened when I visited their ministry for 
a different purpose but these two officials, upon asking me about my research topic since I 
introduced myself as a LUMID student, were keen to be hurriedly interviewed before they left their 
office for other assignments. It turned out to be a brief but very rich focus group discussion-like 
interview such that their contribution could not be ignored. Other key stakeholders such as mining 
companies and local suppliers’ associations would have been vital primary data sources.  
 
Among firms, fewer interviews conducted towards the close of daily business tended to be longer 
than the 30 minutes average (excluding introductions) because the respondents were relaxed and 
had more time. Most interviews were hurriedly done considering that respondents have higher 
designations and tighter schedules in their firms. Consequently, most respondents could not fill-out 
a checklist I designed to capture some background information about the firms. They instead opted 
for my e-mailing or leaving the checklist with them so that they could e-mail it later. Realizing the 
non-response risk (which eventually materialized), I probed for relevant details during general 
introductions each respondent gave. Thus, the interviews were enough to abandon the checklist even 
if some of the data from the few completed ones were incorporated into the thesis.  
 
During every interview, I introduced myself and explained the rationale for my LUMID research 
including my gatekeeper project. This was meant to ascertain my identity and clarify why the data 
were being collected so that major ethical issues of harm to respondents, lack of informed consent, 
privacy invasion and deception were out-rightly handled (Bryman, 2004: 509). The respondent’s 
consent to be interviewed and have their voices recorded to ease and back-up my note taking was 
sought using an informed consent form (see appendix II). Consequently, most respondents from 
firms signed the informed consent form (Cresswell, 2007: 89) and accepted to be recorded whereas 
fewer did not consent to voice recording but verbally consented to the interview. For the formally 
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interviewed government officials, a formal request in writing with the consent form attached was 
submitted for approval. A verbal consent to the interview was made but no voice recording was 
allowed.   
 
During my introductions, I urged respondents to ask questions at any time during the interview and 
assured them about confidentiality and anonymity of their views presented in the thesis (Scheyvens 
& Storey, 2003: 142). At the end of most interviews, as a result of a good relationship developed 
during the interview, some respondents allowed me to tour their offices and/or workshops and take 
photos.  
 
For deception concerns, one respondent from a firm demanded that I show him an identity card and 
other official documents before proceeding with the interview. After presenting such, the interview 
was successful and yielded sufficiently useful data since the respondent was so knowledgeable. He 
successfully established and operated his firm after working for the mines before which he obtained 
an engineering master’s degree abroad in Europe. This, as an example of the relatively high level of 
education among respondents, made it easier to conduct interviews without any major ethical 
challenges. Ultimately, notwithstanding some limitations and ethical concerns, the research process, 
its findings and analysis provide a basis for credibility and trustworthiness for this thesis.  
 
5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1 Institutions and firms in theory 
Institutions can be broadly defined as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of 
repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, 
sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales” (Ostrom, 2005: 3). 
Ostrom’s definition relates to that by Douglass North who views them as “the structure that humans 
impose on human interaction and therefore define incentives that, together with the other constraints 
(budget, technology, etc.), determine the choices that individuals make that shape the performance 
of societies and economies over time” (North, 1993: 35).   
 
From these two definitions, a key distinction between institutions and organizations or firms arises. 
That is, if we regard institutions as “rules of the game” established for instance in Zambia by 
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government, the mining MNCs, and banks, then the local value-adding firms (and the entrepreneurs) 
are the players organizing themselves as teams to play the game according to those rules in a 
liberalized environment (DfID, 2003: ii; North, 1993: 36; North, 1998: 24). Here the firm can then 
be defined as “a legal entity – one that signs contracts with its suppliers, distributors, employees and 
often customers…Once established, a firm becomes a pool of learned skills, physical facilities and 
liquid capital” (Chandler, 1992: 483). Some scholars have emphasized contracts in their definitions 
of the firm as “the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals” (Dosi et al, 1998: 
154).    
 
The distinction, in North’s view, portrays firms both as beneficiaries and agents of institutional 
change through their quest to achieve their goals. Institutional change in this regard is viewed as an 
incremental process of self-transformation to firms actualizing the rules of the game (Kingstone & 
Caballero, 2009: 154; Ostrom, 1990: 139). If the “players” play based on the rules external to them, 
as a team they equally have internal rules. Internal rules (which are also an institution) affect how 
they conform to or deviate from the rules of the game and how they actually play hence their 
performance. Here we see that firms’ performance is not just based on internal capability but also on 
opportunities and constraints surrounding environments provide (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006: 86).   
 
5.2 Model of analysis for factors external to the firm  
The relationship between institutions and how they determine the courses of action and performance 
in firms and in turn macro-level development is not easy to conceptualize or even diagrammatically 
illustrate. This notwithstanding, Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
Framework (figure 3) is a close proxy.   
Figure 3: Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
 
Source: Ostrom (2009: 829) as cited in Drew & Kriz (2012: 71).   
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Ostrom’s IAD framework demonstrates how the institutional environment affects the firm in its 
business operations to result into outcomes. The IAD framework is a multilayer conceptual map of 
institutions helping in organizing measures for organizations in their efforts to devise workable 
solutions. In this framework, there are essentially three key aspects with the focal point being the 
“action arena” which interacts with and is shaped by “exogenous variables” to result into 
“outcomes” as the third aspect. These three major aspects have sub-components within them as 
figure 3 illustrates (Ostrom, 2005: 13, 14, 29).   
 
In figure 3, institutions mainly as exogenous variables have three components: biophysical/material 
conditions; attributes of the community; and rules. In Ostrom’s view, material conditions referred to 
the features of the biophysical or material world within which it is possible to engage the rules for 
action to occur and in turn result into goods and services being produced. Beside material conditions 
are the attributes of the community which the stakeholders possess in their daily interaction. The 
attributes simultaneously influence the structure of those interactions and the resultant actions in the 
action arenas. These attributes could include the values of generally accepted behaviour in society, 
and can be formal or informal (Drew & Kriz, 2012: 67, 71; Ostrom, 2005: 22-27).    
 
The third category of exogenous variables “rules in use”, in Ostrom’s view, entails many things 
basically summarized into four main aspects: regulations, precepts, instructions, and principles. In 
this thesis I dwell on Ostrom’s understanding of rules in use as regulations because they are more 
applicable to the subject matter. Further, given the complexity of applying material conditions and 
attributes of the community to the analysis in this thesis, only the rules in use category is adopted as 
in figure 5. Overall, as regulations, the rules in use denote “something laid down by an authority” 
(Ostrom, 2005: 16) as a requirement to be upheld by an individual, group of individuals or in this 
thesis a supplier firm or an MNC. Therefore, the government is like an umbrella covering rules in 
use by the mines, bank financial institutions and local firms. Similarly, the mines and banks as 
institutions also set rules in use to be complied by the local firms in their quest to supply to the 
mines or seek credit from the banks respectively.  
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In this thesis I have related Ostrom’s conceptualization to how government, mines and bank 
financial institutions in Zambia influence (or would influence) the success or failure of the local 
value-adding firms supplying to the mines. This usage is however cognizant of the weaknesses 
inherent in Ostrom’s IAD framework. It is criticized for its lack of an ontological basis to explain 
the sources of the initial conditions characterizing the three components of exogenous factors in the 
framework, and why such conditions are never constant across different scenarios (Drew & Kriz, 
2012: 72). Given that this conceptualization is applicable to factors external to the firm, the next 
section addresses the firm’s internal factors determining its success or failure.  
 
5.3 Theory of the firm and model of analysis  
To make the firm as the major unit of analysis, the theory of the firm enables us to assess the local 
value-adding supplier firms’ performance in Zambia’s mining sector. The firm has a number of 
internal factors that constitute its performance. Paramount are the firm’s strategy, structure and core 
capabilities (Chandler, 1992: 491) as illustrated in figure 4.  
Figure 4: Model of Analysis for Factors Internal to the Firm 
 
Source: Adopted from Beamon (1999: 282) and modified based on Chandler (1992); Nelson (1991).  
 
According to Nelson (1991), the three aspects - strategy, structure and capabilities/core capabilities - 
are distinct but interrelated whereby the strategy and structure of the firm ultimately determine its 
core capabilities. By strategy what Nelson meant is “a set of broad commitments made by the firm 
that define and rationalize its objectives and how it intends to pursue them” (Chandler, 1992: 491). 
A strategy broadly defines the desired firm without much detail. As for the structure, it “involves 
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how a firm is organized and governed, and how decisions actually are made and carried out, and 
thus largely determines what it actually does, given the broad strategy” (Nelson, 1991:67). Clearly 
defining core capabilities (even if strategies and structures are part) is not easy. What Nelson (1991) 
seems to explain is that capabilities are generally the firm’s abilities to innovate and take economic 
advantage of its innovation to remain repetitively innovative in a competitively dynamic 
environment.   
 
When all these factors combine in the firm’s core capabilities, they then determine its performance 
which is assessed through three broad variables: resources; output; and flexibility (Beamon, 1999: 
282). In Beamon’s (1999) view, these variables are such that the firm could strive to be efficient in 
managing its financial and human resources to ensure profitability. It may also endeavour to satisfy 
customers’ needs through the provision of high quality products or services. This goodwill coupled 
with the entrepreneurial and managerial skills of the entrepreneur, as well as the skills among the 
employees would then constitute the flexibility with which the firm responds to a challenging and 
changing environment shaped by institutional change.   
 
In this thesis, performance was understood and assessed through three broad variables: resources; 
output; and flexibility. These three aspects arise from a combination of the firms’ core capabilities 
as already explained. Therefore, the   resources meant human and financial resources as well as the 
plant, equipment and machinery available in the firms. Resources were operationalized by 
considering the annual turnover the firms made and the number and skills of employees. Output 
simply meant the goods and services the firms produce and supply to the mining MNCs. Flexibility 
concerns the ability with which the firms appropriately adjust and respond to a changing business 
environment (Beamon, 1999: 282). Therefore, flexibility basically meant the firms’ success factors.   
 
The challenge of these aspects in the model of analysis is that they were mainly assessed 
qualitatively whereas the larger part of the model is more suitable for quantification. Despite this 
challenge, assessing the performance of local value-adding firms supplying to the mines in Zambia 
through such aspects still gives a trustworthy picture. It enables viewing the firm as an actor in the 
action arena where the exogenous institutional factors arising from government, mining MNCs, and 
banks have a stronger bearing on its performance as in Ostrom’s model. 
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5.4 Institutions versus the firm combined model of analysis  
Given that the two models presented and discussed above are broad and have several aspects that 
cannot be adequately discussed in this thesis due to lack of space, some external and internal aspects 
of the firm were merged into a single model of analysis (figure 5). The conceptualization of the 
components therein remains the same as in figures 3 and 4. The emphasis is on the currently higher 
influence of mining MNCs and banks on local value-adding suppliers unlike the influence from 
government. 
 
Figure 5: Operationalized Model of Analysis for Exogenous and Internal Factors 
 
Source: Author’s own based on Beamon (1999), Chandler (1992), Nelson (1991), and Ostrom (2005) 
 
6 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section presents and analyzes the results. The firm is the unit of analysis thus commencing with 
its internal capabilities. As for institutional/exogenous factors, their potentially and/or actually 
decisive impact on firms’ performance in a liberalized business environment as literature and 
empirical evidence reveals are later discussed to consolidate the analysis.  
 
6.1 Firms’ Internal Capabilities 
6.1.1 Descriptive Features and Background  
The 15 local firms investigated had contrasting and similar features depicting their capabilities. 
They record varying levels of success and perform differently whilst facing similar challenges in 
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supplying to the mines relative to their financial, human and other resources. Table 1 summarizes 
some of their numerable attributes. Overall, the varied features make the firms, to some extent, fall 
within Zambia’s definition of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) which categorizes 
firms based on total fixed investments, sales turnover, number of employees, and legal status (GRZ, 
2008).  
 
The challenge in strictly relating MSMEs’ definition to the reality among the investigated firms 
however necessitated convenient creation of alternative categories of the firms’ features as in table 1 
to uphold confidentiality and anonymity of each firm. The mismatch between the definition and the 
firms’ reality partly arises from the categorization of medium enterprises (the largest among 
MSMEs) as those having a turnover from ZMK300 million to ZMK800 million; and employing 
between 51 and 100 people (GRZ, 2008: 14). Therefore, only two firms by turnover fell in the 
medium enterprise category whereas very few qualified in that category by virtue of their smaller 
number of employees.        
 
Table 1: Descriptive features of Local Firms 
Feature  Description Count 
Year firm was established/acquired Before 1991 1 
1991 - 2001 5 
2002 - 2012 9 
Type of firm ownership Individual Proprietor 10 
Joint partnership
3
  2 
Family 3 
Main line of business Manufacturing/fabrication 3 
Construction/civil/mechanical engineering 8 
Electrical services/ICT 2 
Trading  2 
Number of employees – permanent  1-19 6 
20-99 6 
100+ 3 
Number of employees – aggregate 
(permanent + temporal/part-time) 
1-19 1 
20-99 9 
100+ 5 
Turnover per annum Less than ZMK 1 billion
4
 2 
ZMK 1 – ZMK 5 billion 5 
ZMK 6 – ZMK 10 billion 1 
                                                 
3
 This is used to denote firms with shared ownership between two or more people who are not related/family members. It 
includes firms where e.g. a foreign national jointly owns the firm with an indigenous Zambian; or where 2 or more 
Zambians own the business 
4
 At the time of fieldwork, the exchange rate between US Dollar and Zambian Kwacha was USD 1 = about ZMK5, 000. 
Thus, ZMK 1 billion = about USD 200, 000. At the time of thesis writing however, Zambia’s currency had already been 
rebased by knocking out three zeros whereby instead of having ZMK5,000 it will now be  USD1 = ZMW5 
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Above ZMK 10 billion 4 
Note: n = 15 but does not always equal to that number in the count given missing data 
Source: Author’s own; based on Field Data (2013a) 
 
Before discussing the firms’ capabilities, it is vital to comment on when they were established to 
relate them to the liberalization-induced institutional changes shaping the environment within which 
they operate thus contextualize their performance. All the 15 firms, except one, were established in 
the post-1991 large-scale liberalization. This unique case successfully manufactured and supplied 
value-added products and services to the mines both before and during the early years of 
liberalization. It was established before Zambia’s independence in 1953 by some white owners who 
operated it before an indigenous Zambian, who is currently the owner and owns other big 
companies, became a major shareholder in 1965. The firm now hardly manufactures anything but 
largely supplies civil and mechanical engineering services to the mines (Field Data, 2013a). Though 
a unique case, it provides some insights into how liberalization impacted similar firms’ performance 
as analyzed by respondents. For example, another respondent revealed that his firm currently 
operates at about 15% utilization capacity with most equipment used in the manufacturing process 
just packed and gathering dust.  
 
Although liberalization drastically reduced some firms’ performance and eventually closures, other 
firms such as the two other categories which were established during the 1991-2001 and 2002-2012 
periods emerged. Five of them were established during the first 10 years of liberalization. It should 
however be noted here, as earlier, that though the liberalization process started in 1991 with the 
election of Chiluba as Republican President, the actual privatization of mines commenced in the late 
1990s (Lungu, 2008: 407). Most firms were established during the 2002-2012 period. In 2002 
government commenced national development initiatives meant to address the impact of 
liberalization on the economy (GRZ, 2006). This could be an explanation for the firms’ performance 
from 2002 even if the 2008/9 global economic crisis obviously had its own impact. Other 
capabilities which have constrained or enhanced their performance are observable through their 
resources, output and the flexibility in responding to changing market environment.    
6.1.2 Resources  
Based on fieldwork and literature, both quantity and quality matter in explaining why the 
performance of the firms in Zambia is constrained. Quantity for instance matters regarding 
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resources – turnover and capital; and number of employees. Quality matters for example concerning 
education levels and skills among entrepreneurs and their employees; and the quality of goods and 
services produced and supplied to the mines.  
 
Turnover: theory of the firm contends that the financial, human, technological and other resources a 
firm has and how it utilizes them is an important determinant for performance (Man & Chan, 
2002:129). Particularly, financial and human resources are vital to the firms. Their annual turnover 
fluctuates depending on the intensity and number of contracts secured and executed per financial 
year. Most firms’ annual turnover fluctuates between ZMK1 billion and ZMK5 billion - implying 
most firms are small. There was a unique case which in recent years has had turnover fluctuate 
within the smaller firms’ category but exponentially rose to ZMK60 billion in 2012. It has to be 
underscored that no other firm which disclosed its turnover currently earns such high. Based on 
available statistics therefore, only three firms have recently been having a turnover ranging from 
ZMK20 billion to ZMK25 billion making a total of four firms with a turnover of at least ZMK10 
billion. The unique firm’s financial success in 2012 was attributed to its taking over major contracts 
for another firm which closed down. Much of the finances the firm earned were spent on building its 
capacity by hiring more qualified and skilled workers; and purchasing some core equipment it never 
had before (Field Data, 2013a).  
 
Though some firms record higher turnover, all argued that their current turnover is insufficient to 
favourably compete and secure contracts like their foreign counterparts. The local firms’ actual or 
sometimes perceived lack of financial capacity is what Hanlin (2011) stresses as one major factor 
making mining companies prefer foreign suppliers. Moreover, he maintains, the mines’ tendency of 
appointing foreign companies is motivated by the reputation of such companies to deliver capital-
intensive projects. The mines fear the financial risk among local firms who if contracted may fail to 
perform thus jeopardize the mine’s progress. A government official also stressed these concerns:      
The mines may require suppliers with capacity to supply and maintain equipment. But 
you find that many local suppliers may not have that capacity considering that supplies 
to the mines are in huge volumes. Suppliers are also expected to secure letters of credit 
to supply very expensive and specialized equipment sometimes in volumes. But still 
you find that local suppliers do not have that capacity (Field Data, 2013c).    
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Local entrepreneurs and their firms constantly find themselves struggling to sustain their success. 
The prevailing situation however relates to Casson’s (2005) argument that the firms are in constant 
lack of financial capital because they spend all their available funds. If they reinvested part of their 
profits to build their capacity it would increase their chances of being contracted by the mines. 
 
Number of employees: the World Bank classifies firms, in the enterprise survey, as small, medium 
or big if they have 1-19 employees, 20–99 employees, and 100 plus employees respectively (World 
Bank, 2008). This applied to Zambia’s local firms supplying to mines places most of them in the 
small firms’ category with less than 20 full-time employees. Some firms hardly have 10 such 
employees. Five firms which are in the medium firms’ category barely had 50 full-time employees. 
Only three firms are evidently big with over 100 full-time employees. Most firms however do hire 
extra labour up to a few hundreds each year depending on the nature and magnitude of projects 
executed for their clients. Hiring extra labour is commonest among smaller firms where they do not 
constantly have big projects requiring the maintenance of permanently employed staff as noted by 
one respondent that “we don’t employ many people on a permanent basis because our jobs are task-
oriented. For example, if your contractor gives you a task to paint this house, when you finish 
painting then you release the workers because you hired them for a temporal job” (Field Data, 
2013a).  
 
Local supplier firms generally fail to benefit from the mining MNCs’ presence because they are 
resource constrained (Di Guardo & Valentini, 2005: 56). Their lower numbers of full-time 
employees, even before discussing skills and qualifications among all employees, evidently depict 
their human resource constraint unlike foreign firms. Most respondents noted this as one major 
factor constraining the firms’ performance: 
It is very difficult for Zambian suppliers to break into highly technical supplies to the 
mines. For instance, international suppliers such as Atlas Corpco when they supply 
equipment, they also supply experts stationed at the mines to provide specialized 
services related to their equipment. They provide necessary advice to mines (Field Data, 
2013c). 
    
As a separate contract from that of supplying all drilling consumables for instance, Sandvik has over 
60 permanent employees stationed at Lumwana mine just to execute an extensive maintenance and 
repair contract (E & MJ, 2011: 59). Sandvik’s number of employees on a single project is higher 
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than what most local firms in figure 2 have. Local firms cannot just employ more people to compete 
against foreign firms amidst their weak financial capacity. It is known that the resource base 
expands “only when a firm is mature, and cash flow is strong” (Casson, 2005: 337).   
 
Considering the number of years most firms have existed, they could be called ‘mature’ except their 
cash flow reality is different. A comparison between annual turnover and number of employees in 
each firm shows mixed and interesting findings. Generally, the firms can be grouped into two: 
labour intensive; and non-labour intensive. For example, a firm which supplies ICT services and is 
among the more successful firms per turnover does not hire extra labour. Besides, its number of 
permanent employees is almost the same as that for a construction firm which has a comparable 
turnover but is more labour intensive thus inevitably employs more than 100 temporal workers. The 
ICT services providing firm also has a turnover double that of another construction company which 
is more labour intensive and has the highest number of permanent employees as it operates on a ‘no 
part-time employment’ stance except for highly specialized contracts where the expertize is 
internally unavailable.   
 
Based on available statistics, a construction engineering company having the highest turnover has an 
overall less number of employees than another construction company having half its turnover. 
Among the lower turnover firms category, variations were also observable. Some who earned a little 
higher than others had fewer permanent employees. Fewer firms whose turnover was relatively 
higher equally had relatively higher full-time staff numbers. All of them however hired extra labour 
to execute their labour intensive supplies (Field Data, 2013a).  
 
The above shows difficulties local firms have in managing their financial and human resources to 
perform better. Though their annual expenses on employees’ salaries were not investigated, it seems 
obvious that some firms have their financial resources spent more on one factor of production 
(labour/human resources) than building other capabilities such as technological improvements 
through investing in equipment and machinery. The opposite was also observed through the firm 
whose turnover exponentially grew from about ZMK5 to ZMK60 billion. This firm spent more 
money on purchasing equipment to build its initially weak capacity. It hired more short-term 
employees which are considered cheaper. In both cases however, the firms’ contribution to the 
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economy through payment of taxes and job creation is evident. The constraint here though is that 
the entrepreneurs and the firms’ management (where they exist) may not be striking the right 
balance to ensure profitability and higher perform. Particularly for the entrepreneur, the theory of 
the firm contends that his/her characteristics besides the skills and technical know-how they possess 
tend to be the most cited factors greatly influencing the firm’s performance (Man & Chan, 
2002:125). 
 
Employees’ skills and Entrepreneur’s Capabilities: the extent to which workers are educated and 
skilled is argued to significantly improve the firms’ performance. Moreover, firms having better 
educated proprietors and managers perform higher (Clarke, 2012:5). In this regard, most firms have 
their full-time employees possessing a varied combination of technical skills, qualifications and 
experience in engineering-related fields. It is principally required among firms which supply 
different engineering-related products and services to the mines to prove their registration with 
regulatory authorities such as NCC and EIZ. This ascertains their having technically qualified staff 
or at least some shareholders and/or proprietors for technical understanding of the supplies made. 
The numbers of technically qualified employees besides the equipment firms have also determine 
their classification and the nature of contracts they can handle for clients (Uriyo et al, 2004:6).  
 
Most firms have a number of their staff possessing bachelor’s degrees in engineering and trades 
certificates in fields such as metal fabrication and bricklaying. Some of the proprietors who serve as 
CEOs or Directors for their firms have qualifications as high as Master of Science in engineering-
related fields obtained from reputable Western Universities. Others have tertiary education at 
different levels relevant to value-adding supplies. In fewer cases, the proprietors have tertiary 
education in other fields such as accounts. For instance, one of the co-founders and co-directors of a 
family-owned construction company is a qualified accountant whereas his siblings are a civil 
engineer and quantity surveyor respectively. Another construction firm is also owned and 
successfully directed by an accountant. Almost all proprietors have had careers either in the mines 
or related sectors where they worked for some years before establishing their own businesses. Some 
served in managerial positions whereas others served in technical positions actively and practically 
involved in activities on site. Some of their employees also have similar backgrounds.  
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Despite the entrepreneurs’ level of education and management experience besides their number of 
skilled and qualified employees characterizing what should be most firms’ strong capabilities, the 
firms’ performance remains constrained against what the theory of the firm postulates. It could be 
that constraints emanate from the mismatch between firms’ capabilities and prevailing market 
characteristics. Some scholars have expressed it as: “globalization is creating both opportunities and 
challenges for innovative enterprises, forcing companies to make dramatic improvements not only 
to compete and prosper but merely to survive” (Waggoner et al, 1999:53). In this view, most local 
value-adding firms could be merely surviving for many years due to the performance-constraining 
external environment.    
6.1.3 Output   
The two main categories –manufacturing and construction- of the interviewed firms suggest their 
output is either goods or services. Those into manufacturing supply assorted fabricated products. 
Others are more into supplying civil engineering services such as some concrete works on mines’ 
sites. Most firms from either category sometimes do activities done by others. For instance, some 
civil engineering companies revealed that when contracted to construct some infrastructure 
requiring some metal work, they simply buy raw materials and fabricate the required products from 
their workshops.   
 
This, in their view, is a cost-cutting measure. What it suggests however, are constraints to 
performance arising from lack of high levels of specialization among firms. Moreover, it points out 
their inability to subcontract some works to others who can easily deliver hence support each other 
in building their capacities. This lack of collaboration to maximize each other’s endowments and 
competitive advantage to serve as a source of improved performance extends to competition the 
firms exert on each other when tendering to supply their output. A government official for example 
expressed these concerns that: 
The other problem that exists among our local suppliers is that they don’t tender as a group 
to maximize each other’s advantages and strengths so as to minimize even the collateral 
issues. They instead tender individually and increase competition against each other, in the 
end a stronger foreign bidder comes and wins the bid since the local suppliers are already 
fragmented (Field Data, 2013c). 
 
37 
Though goods, unlike services, as output are quantifiable to measure the firms’ performance, 
quantification was not viable in this qualitative research-based thesis. Qualitative indicators of 
performance such as product quality and customer service and satisfaction were instead observed 
(Waggoner et al, 1999:54). According to Beamon (1999), firms strive for output with higher levels 
of customer service to ensure retention of customers. This, as an aspiration, is also true for the local 
value-adding firms in Zambia except the mining MNCs tend to bypass their products preferring 
foreign procurement. One of them observed that:   
Things have changed! The mines are outsourcing from abroad bringing in things which 
can be [cheaply and efficiently] produced here in Zambia. It is even laughable 
sometimes when you see tanks being transported on big haulage trucks from South 
Africa. We can make those tanks. We have made a lot of them for Kansanshi and 
Mopani mines. You wonder why people [the mines] buy those things from South Africa 
- it doesn’t make sense! (Field Data, 2013a).  
 
Figure 6: Example of Basic Fabrication Products 
 
Source: Author’s 
 
According to Hanlin (2011), the mining companies are to blame mainly for their lack of contact 
with local suppliers some of which produce high quality products. He observes that: 
Even when a procurement function is located on the operational mine site the procurement 
officers [who are often foreign experts] may have little interaction with the local economy 
preferring to use corporate procurement structures and bypassing local potential. This tends to 
occur due to the insular and geographically remote nature of many mine sites. Lack of 
exposure to the local environment tends to lead to lack of appreciation of what can be feasibly 
procured from local suppliers (Hanlin, 2011: 9). 
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Hanlin’s (2011) view interestingly supports local suppliers’ concerns although it fails to 
acknowledge that many local value-adding suppliers are registered in the mines’ databases and both 
parties have electronic (and sometimes physical) access to each other despite their geographical 
location. Moreover, local suppliers do bid to supply whenever tenders are floated. Some local 
manufacturers have a track-record of supplying quality products but for some reasons the mines 
would abruptly stop procuring locally. It is obvious that during the 2007/08 global economic crisis 
most mines cut-down some procurement as a cost-saving measure. Conversely, the situation 
currently is such that internal capabilities among local firms to produce quality output are not an 
automatic guarantee for their being preferred by the mines. It is evident that “supplying to mines is 
just like any other business around the world where people need to compete and be able to supply 
quality products and services. So the mines go for whatever is in their best interest [and not local 
suppliers’ interest]” (Field Data, 2013c).  
6.1.4 Flexibility  
The firm’s “ability to respond to a changing environment” (Beamon, 1999: 281) determines its 
staying in business. Such flexibility is part of its sources of improved performance in supplying to 
the mines thereby having backward linkages. It is difficult for local value-adding firms to navigate 
through the currently challenging market due to, among other reasons, how to lower production 
costs where competitors who simply trade would cheaply purchase similar sometimes inferior 
products from abroad as noted by a respondent:  
For companies like ours, its challenging since there has been the mushrooming of these- 
not companies per se but- suppliers/traders that have flooded this business such that 
they will quote similar products like ours but they will go and get gong’a [fake] ones 
from a cheaper source abroad (Field Data, 2013b).  
 
To have the flexibility to respond to customers’ demands and competitors, local value-adding firms 
require an optimal presence of heavy-duty or industrial machinery both at their plants and on site 
where their clients’ tasks are executed. This also makes such business capital intensive. The more 
manufacturing and fabrication works-inclined firms have workshops/plants at their premises 
equipped with some necessary machinery but the visibility of such machinery is relative to the 
financial size of each firm. Based on observations and acknowledgement from most respondents, 
only one firm has an outstanding and more admirable fabrication and manufacturing reputation 
among them. The more construction-oriented big firms also have necessary machinery and haulage 
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trucks – some visibly displayed on their websites also. For some smaller firms which did not clearly 
display value-adding endowments, the tendency was that they (using their own employees) 
occasionally rented other firms’ workshops to fabricate some required supplies (Field Data, 2013d).   
 
Figure 7: Example of Firms' Plant/Workshop  
 
Source: Author’s 
 
6.2 Firms’ Strategies and Structures 
The highly competitive external environment to which the entrepreneur and his firm are exposed 
demands them to devise efficient and sophisticated internal institutions to ensure the firm survives, 
performs and grows (Ostrom, 1990: 40-41). Firms exist to take advantage of the opportunities 
created by institutions because there is a symbiotic nature of interaction between institutions and 
firms whereby the later evolve due to incentive mechanisms provided by the former. Where there is 
a feedback mechanism, it enables the entrepreneurs or the firms to respond to the opportunities the 
institutions avail (North, 1990: 7).  
 
Even if some firms have been squeezed-out of the market, many firms have emerged to take 
advantage of the opportunities liberalization has unlocked in the mining sector. Overall, the impact 
of institutional change associated to the 1991 initiated liberalization of Zambia’s economy has been 
the existence or emergence of three types of firms. The first typology is those which were smaller at 
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the time of liberalization or those which just emerged. Their performance and growth has 
significantly improved over the years. The second category has those firms whose performance has 
been improving but experiencing slower or fluctuating growth. The last type depicts firms which 
were vibrantly existent at the time of liberalization but have somewhat constantly experienced a 
performance downward spiral as table 2 details.   
 
Table 2: Types of value-adding firms created by liberalized mining environment 
 
 
For the manufacturing or metal fabrication-based firms, there exist fewer possibilities of 
diversifying their market share away from the mining sector. This is largely because the non-mining 
sector where fabrication products, such as door and window frames, are required such products are 
easily produced by many informal sector entrepreneurs who for example in 2008 accounted for 
about 90% of the increased MSMEs sector activities since liberalization (GRZ, 2008: 9). Therefore, 
where efforts to increase market share for their products in the mining sector fail, manufacturing 
oriented firms inevitably reduce their production capacity or consequently shutdown. As for 
construction-based firms, their ability to supply to the mines tends to increase their competitiveness 
to secure tenders to supply similar services in other sectors (such as schools and clinics 
construction) which usually have less-stringent requirements and are less capital intensive. This has 
therefore made most such firms to significantly diversify away from supplies to mines. Interviews 
revealed that this diversification trend intensified during the 2008/2009 global economic crisis thus 
enabled firms to bridge turnover gaps emergent from reduced contracts with the mines. The only 
challenge such firms experienced was the prolonged delay in being paid especially if the executed 
projects were government funded. Generally, after the global economic crisis such firms had 
comparatively better financial capabilities to successfully bid for tenders in the mining sector hence 
their currently upward performance trajectory.    
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Since institutions and institutional change can either be performance enhancing or impeding to the 
firm, the firm needs to have strategies and structures to maximize the enhancing qualities whilst 
optimizing constraints. Internal capabilities constitute the firm’s decision making processes for 
profit maximization and are crucially significant as they define the “internal organization of the firm 
and the accompanying structure” (Gaynor, 1989: 59). The strategies, structures and other 
capabilities serving as the investigated firms’ performance enhancing sources are summarized in 
table 3.     
 
Table 3: Firms' Strategies and Structures as Sources of Performance 
 
 
Although some firms have strategies and structures shaping their internal capabilities, others do not 
have. Therefore, the reverse of the performance enhancers characterizing the firms are shown in 
table 4.    
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Table 4: Firms' Strategies and Structures as Constraints to Performance 
 
 
6.3 Firms’ Exogenous Environment and Institutional Change 
Indisputably, Zambia’s 1991economic liberalization is a landmark institutional change that has had 
diverse effects on local supplier firms and their corporate relationships with mining MNCs and 
banks as a source of credit. Similarly, strong consensus exists among respondents that government’s 
liberalization decision consequently allowing FDI flows has over the years enabled many mining 
MNCs to invest in the country thereby increasingly expands the market available to local suppliers. 
One respondent affirmed that “I can say government did well because in the past we never had so 
many mines. We didn’t have Kansanshi or Lumwana mines – they just came up. At least 
government on that note has worked, and we can say it has helped create jobs and grow the market 
for us to supply”. Another one added that “before privatization there were fewer jobs and 
contractors. I think everyone just depended on working for the mines - being in formal employment; 
but after privatization everything opened up and not just looking at the mines” (Field Data, 2013a).  
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Whereas tangible benefits from liberalization are evident, the equally substantial negative impact on 
the manufacturing sector shows external factors constraining the firms’ performance and their 
contribution to industrial linkages. A view held by most respondents was well expressed by one of 
them that: 
The manufacturing industry in Zambia, specifically on the Copperbelt, has been 
declining for over 20 years now since the economy was liberalized. When I joined this 
company, the whole of this street, on both sides, had a lot of companies manufacturing 
at full capacity. Most companies have since closed down; and for the few remaining 
ones I don't know at what production capacity they are operating. For us here we are 
almost at 50% production capacity and we have now moved from making things into 
this trading thing largely…The manufacturing sector here in Zambia has collapsed so 
there are very few companies which manufacture things here [on the Copperbelt]. Those 
manufacturing in Lusaka it’s biscuits and plastic things they produce but not 
engineering products (Field Data, 2013b). 
What this implies according to institutional change theory is that the external environment exerts 
thrust on firms from two dimensions. On one hand, the external environment could pose technical, 
economic and physical demands on the firm; and on the other hand be responsible for social, 
cultural, political and legal pressures. Pressures from the first dimension compel firms to effectively 
and efficiently produce and sell their products and services or simply closedown if they cannot 
compete. The second dimension shapes the firm’s public face as a legal entity adhering to rules 
(Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006: 86).  
 
This applied to my thesis places the mining MNCs and banks in the first category actively and 
constantly exerting pressure on local value-adding firms whereas government’s role, in the second 
dimension, is passive in the background. When the two dimensions combine (even if the mining 
companies are more dominant), they set the rules of the game governing how the firms play. This 
means even if every individual firm has internal capabilities different from those of others, the 
existent structural aspects significantly and ultimately influence their general behavior (Morris et al, 
2012: 411). This is where mining companies, banks and government come in as factors external to 
firms.  
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6.3.1 Mining MNCs 
The most significant rules of the game are those determining the relationship between the local 
value-adding firms and the mining MNCs. It is obvious that how the firms secure contracts to 
supply to mining companies amidst high competition from both local and foreign firms has greatly 
changed since Zambia’s liberalization in 1991. Interviews revealed mining MNCs’ unchallenged 
dominance in shaping rules and standards governing suppliers. Local procurement which externally 
determines local firms’ performance is absolutely dictated by the mining MNCs. This disadvantages 
local-value adding suppliers and in the long run national industrial development. To decisively 
demonstrate this influence, a firm interviewed photocopied for me a letter recently received from 
one of the big mining MNC directing suppliers to reduce prices for their products without 
questioning.   
 
Figure 8: Extract from a Letter by an anonymized Mining MNC in Zambia 
 
Source: Field Data (2013a)  
 
Through government’s efforts, especially from 2002, to improve the investment climate for mining 
MNCs, the years before the global financial crisis were “revolutionary in terms of increasing 
investment, exploration concessions and improving infrastructure development” (E&MJ, 2007: 62). 
With such investments which resumed after the global economic crisis, Zambia has had many 
opportunities to experience diverse and substantial spillover effects through local suppliers dealing 
with the mines. Most respondents observed that the reality on the ground contrasts general 
expectations as reflected in comments such as these:   
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And then on the new big mines that are coming up such as Lumwana and Kansanshi: 
when they were starting [mine development phase] we thought as an eligible panel 
manufacturer and supplier here in Zambia we would have an opportunity to supply. We 
never really got much in terms of supplying electrical switchboards because they came 
in with complete things - the machinery and the boards [were all imported thus cutting 
us off] (Field Data, 2013c). 
 
If you asked the mines: how are you contributing to the economy and working with 
local contractors and companies? They will tell you 80% of their business is with local 
supply or local purchases. Yet on the ground you don’t see that filtering down to the 
locals. If a mine in a year spends, for argument sake, USD 4 billion as part of its 
expenditure on the operations of the mine and then we calculate 80% of that money as 
being spent to source local suppliers and whatever goods and services that are supplied 
by local suppliers, you would have seen the economy change. But then why is it not 
changing? The question that comes in then is who is a local supplier? You will discover 
that a local supplier is actually a multinational company such as Sandvic or Atlas 
Corpco which has offices locally within Zambia (Field Data, 2013a).  
 
All these views illustrate how difficult it is for local value-adding firms, despite their internal 
capabilities, to improve their performance. Their capabilities may indeed be weaker than those of 
most foreign firms but their potential is huge and has been well demonstrated in the contracts they 
have executed over the years. If harnessed, their potential can contribute to both harvesting benefits 
from mining MNCs and industrial development. Their sources of improved performance lie in their 
human and financial resources, output and the strategies they employ to navigate through the 
challenging market mining MNCs provide; and how well they structure resources at their disposal to 
realize their corporate objectives. For most firms, access to credit would help build their capital base 
and strengthen their capacity to successfully compete when mining companies avail opportunities.  
6.3.2 Sources of Credit 
Even if financial capital is a crucially significant need among local value-adding firms, where to 
source credit is a major challenge constraining their performance. Currently, all firms interviewed 
need financing but do not have access to ‘formal’ credit. Firms hold accounts with some banks 
simply as a means through which they transact with mines and other suppliers but do not hope to 
secure credit through such banks. The procedure - labourious collateral requirements, high interest 
rates and the time lag between application submission and its approval - significantly constrains 
firms’ efforts to borrow from banks. Consequently, there is a tendency to rely on informal means of 
credit from individuals:    
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So, what we normally do is we go to individuals: maybe there is a retiree who just got his 
pension money, you negotiate with him; he will give you favourable conditions. But it is 
not favourable because you are getting money maybe at 20% interest per 2 or 3 months 
[payback period]. So, you find that the profit you were expecting to get from the contract 
[executed for the mines] is taken-up by the interest from the borrowed money; of which if 
we were getting money from banks at lower rates that would help us a lot. But we don’t 
have access to bank loans (Field Data, 2013a).  
 
The money that some firms borrow through informal means does not sustainably consolidate their 
capability to secure and execute huge contracts with the mining MNCs. Government officials 
interviewed agree on the significance of firms’ huge financial outlay, and one of them expressed it 
that: “the other challenge is we don’t have banks which are willing to lend more and huge sums of 
money to our local suppliers so they can have capacity to supply to mines on huge projects” (Field 
Data, 2013c). Government however has agencies such as Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ); and 
especially Citizens Economic Empowerment Commission (CEEC) which was established in 2006 to 
finance viable initiatives such as those by local entrepreneurs supplying to mines (CEEC, 2013). It 
remains unclear how the targeted entrepreneurs have benefited from CEEC.  
6.3.3 Where is government in all this? 
Seeing the reality through the eyes of the researched and seeking some kind of truth, as per the 
positivist methodological orientation employed in my research, the following three quotes clearly 
express most respondents’ views on government:  
I feel there is some negligence on the part of government – it hasn’t done much to protect 
the local industry. Imagine if so many of us local companies had gotten our hands on all 
those contracts with the big and upcoming mines, we would have grown, increased our 
capacity, and put more people in employment! (Field Data, 2012b).  
 
The problem we have is: you go around government institutions in Zambia, including just 
here in my office [as a government office], the furniture and everything is imported. How 
then can you support or promote local suppliers in such a scenario when you rely on 
imports?” (Field Data, 2013c).  
 
The challenge is that we haven’t had any [government] policy to send our suppliers to 
specialized schools so that they can acquire the required skills and qualify to supply to 
mines. Also we don’t have banks which are willing to lend more and huge sums of 
money to our local suppliers so they can have the capacity to supply to the mines. But 
individual suppliers overtime are able to organize their own resources to be able to supply 
to the mines (Field Data, 2013c). 
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Zambia’s 1991 economic liberalization as a neoliberalism anchored undertaking was meant to 
introduce institutional changes that would make it effective for IMF and World Bank engineered 
policies encouraging free enterprise. Most importantly, such policies were envisaged to enable 
MNCs to transfer and invest their capital in developing countries to enhance development processes 
(Kiely, 2007:169). No doubt that FDI has been transferred to Zambia, but as the respondents’ views 
show, government’s role to make FDI work for the economy through local suppliers’ 
industrialization enhancing role has been pushed to the periphery. According to Fessehaie (2012), 
government has the overall responsibility of developing local value chain in the mining and 
industrial sectors. However, in a liberalized economy, government is constrained to directly 
influence the mining companies’ procurement of products and services from local suppliers. The 
firms widely observe the bad side of liberalization being that “government has got little say such 
that mining companies will do whatever pleases them” (Field Data, 2013a).  
 
Government is also accused of failing to support local firms to favourably compete with foreign 
suppliers. For example, Chinese firms have an “unfair advantage because they are believed to 
receive financial support from their government which we as Zambian contractors don’t get” (Field 
Data, 2013a). Subsidies Chinese firms allegedly receive from their government enable them to bid 
for tenders at lower prices hence out-competing others. Though the few firms in the above ZMK10 
billion category (see table 1) have built financial capacity to favourably compete with some foreign 
firms, most local suppliers contend that recent years have had heightened competition from Chinese 
firms especially. This stiff competition has partly been attributed to lack of government support to 
local suppliers even in awarding public contracts. One respondent highlighted the fierce competition 
Chinese firms posed in public sector contracts especially during President Rupiah Banda’s regime 
which ended in September 2011 and was strongly pro-Chinese: “in the previous regime we faced 
fierce competition in getting government contracts. There were no controls to promote Zambian 
contractors as we had to compete with the Chinese” (Field Data, 2013a). 
 
Zambia’s public sector contracting builds a good case justifying the mining MNCs’ stronger 
advantageous point in contracting local suppliers. Most local firms that have diversified away from 
the mining sector into public sector projects could be able to grow their financial capacity required 
for huge projects in the mines if government supported them in public contracts.  
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Although mining MNCs are required to provide government with what are called Local Business 
Development Plans – an outline of how the mining company intends to support the development of 
local businesses – interviews revealed that such plans are never observed or enforced. The mines, if 
confronted, would clearly justify why they preferred foreign suppliers to local ones. Government 
also argues that penalizing the mines may only be feasible if there are clauses in such plans tying 
them to certain products and services locally available with the required standards and quantities. 
Furthermore, observing and changing procurement processes in the mining sector is currently not 
within the confines of government mandate. Government just recognizes the link between the mines 
and suppliers in general but its priority is on developing the mining processes. The mere recognition 
of suppliers arises because “local suppliers are registered as a trading activity that is linked to the 
mining industry. Supplying business is essentially a social corporate responsibility activity linked to 
the mines” (Field Data, 2013c).   
 
7 WHO THEN IS TO BLAME? 
Deducing from evidence unraveled through my research, augmented by literature and theory, local 
value-adding firms supplying to mines in Zambia are actually more constrained amidst stiff 
competition from especially foreign suppliers and local non-value adding suppliers. If placed on a 
continuum, local value-adding firms are at one end as players in Zambia’s liberalized economy 
whereas the rules of the game of supplying to mining MNCs are on the other end. The players have 
internal capabilities – resources, output, flexibility, strategies and structures - as their controllable 
sources of improved performance to favourably compete and succeed. It is common knowledge that 
everyone faces constraints. A budget constraint is one major reason why local firms’ performance is 
constrained since they cannot independently execute huge value-adding supplies to mines and out-
compete most foreign suppliers whose capital base is stronger. Besides, they hardly collaborate with 
other local suppliers to collectively bid for tenders to stand a better chance of being procured by the 
mines.  
 
Often, players are blamed for failing to score. However, the real constraint to be blamed for the 
firms’ situation does not lie in their weaker internal capabilities but in the rules of the game which 
are externally engineered and applied by mining MNCs as rules’ architects and referees 
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simultaneously. Mining companies have absolute power to determine who supplies, what is supplied 
and the extent to which the supplies are made. Mining conglomerates can unquestionably terminate 
local suppliers’ contracts or decide at what price they can purchase their output making local firms’ 
internal capability more vulnerable.   
 
Whereas government recognizes local value-adding suppliers’ role in the country’s industrial 
development process, it does not directly and actively intervene to make mining MNCs locally 
procure whatever is of the required standard and is produced by local suppliers. This inactivity 
emanates from institutional changes birthed by the 1991 economic liberalization. Undoubtedly, 
liberalization unlocked many opportunities for the country particularly through FDI which 
revitalized the mining sector as the country’s backbone. Until 2002, government’s nearly absolute 
non-interventionist approach to the liberalization aftermath meant local suppliers were completely 
in a phase requiring survival of the fittest strategies. National development planning (and the 
resultant policies for the manufacturing and mining sectors) re-introduced in 2002 was thought to be 
a means through which the intense pressure on local value-adding suppliers would be distilled. To 
date, a sigh of relief for local suppliers seems far-fetched to the blame of government whose 
overarching role has not delivered on the policies.     
 
Based on both literature review and my investigation, the research question culminated into the 
underlying argument that: firstly, local value-adding firms supplying to mining MNCs strongly 
recognize the crucially significant role manufacturing and other value-addition activities play 
throughout the mining supply chain, and to economic growth in general. Secondly, institutional 
changes in recent years - all strongly related to economic liberalization - have overall constrained 
more than they have enabled the said suppliers to easily, consistently and profitably engage in 
value-adding activities oriented to mining. However, the opportunities availed to them to conduct 
multiple business activities are indisputably innumerable given the constantly increasing market in 
the mining sector. Thirdly, most such suppliers currently successful are those, beside other factors, 
who have diversified away from value-adding supplies for only the mines but to other value-adding 
activities targeting clients in other sectors of the economy.    
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For policy implications and recommendations, reversing all or any of the foregoing neither lies in 
“doing business as usual” where mining MNCs remain more powerful in determining the extent to 
which local value-adding suppliers participate in the mining supply chain; nor in government fully 
regulating the relationship between local suppliers and mining companies. What could work is a 
holistic “change of the rules of the game” where government actively engages all stakeholders and 
institutionally offers each category appropriate incentives to subsequently strengthen the buying and 
supplying relationship between mines and local suppliers. Institutional change theory applies here 
by specifically “changing the rules of the game” governing the relationship between local value-
adding suppliers and mining MNCs. In the long run, this would boost backward linkages in the 
manufacturing and mining sectors to the benefit of the country’s industrial development and its 
multiplier effects.  
 
There are some products and services which local firms can easily produce and supply to mines. 
Government could be like a fair referee or at least a coach actively engaging stakeholders to identify 
those products and services where foreign expertise is largely unnecessary and encourage and 
incentivize mining MNCs to procure from local suppliers. It could also be helpful for government to 
provide substantial incentives for local firms who jointly bid and secure major contracts. This would 
help a number of local firms to develop capacity whilst employing many people thereby 
contributing to economic growth in diverse and varying ways.   
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9 APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Interview Guide for Firms 
 
Q1. Firm’s/company background 
 
 Year established 
 Who the owners are; their characteristics; and shareholding extent in the firm  
 Firm’s main business activities relevant to the mining sector  
 Main clients/market share 
 Annual turn over 
 Number of permanent and part-time employees 
 Skills and qualifications among employees 
 Plant and equipment/machinery availability 
 
Q2.  Liberalization and mining MNCs presence 
 
 Opportunities and challenges for supplying to mines  
 Major competitors  
 Mining MNCs’ role 
 Credit sources 
 Government’s role 
 
Q3.  Firm’s success factors  
 
 Firm’s own success factors 
 What the firm sees as general success factors for firms supplying to mines  
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Appendix II: Consent Form 
 
 
 
Date:………………… 
 
Dear respondent, 
 
Thank you for accepting to be interviewed. Your firm/organization has been selected to provide 
input in this study based on your activities and/or interest in the mining sector. I am seeking to 
investigate “Factors constraining the performance of local value-adding firms supplying to the 
mines in Zambia’s liberalized economy” as part of my master’s studies at Lund University in 
Sweden. It is also a study that fits into a broader study being conducted by Copenhagen Business 
School in Denmark and The University of Zambia (and other partner universities) for academic 
purposes; but also with potential of informing policy.  
 
Thus, I would like to assure you that the responses you provide will be treated with the utmost 
confidentiality – your views will be presented in an aggregative manner with those from other 
respondents in order to ensure anonymity. Other details collected will only be used for records and 
future contact should the need for a follow-up by the research network mentioned above arise. 
Kindly answer the questions honestly, and feel free to ask for clarifications at any time, and I will do 
my best to provide the relevant answer. I therefore would like to seek your consent to be 
interviewed and have the interview recorded as a backup for the hand written notes. If this is fine 
with you, kindly append your signature here:  
 
 
Signature:…………………………..Name (optional):………………………… 
 
 
Company/Individual Contact details (provide business card alternatively):…… 
 
  …………………………………………………………………… 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Signed   
 
Wisdom KALENG’A (wisdomck11@mail.com   or, mid11wka@student.lu.se) 
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Appendix III: List of Respondents 
a) Targeted Firms 
1. Oscat Engineeering Limited  
2. Chekolm Industries Limited  
3. Elios Limited  
4. Coppernet Solutions  
5. Meltcast Engineering Limited  
6. Powerflex Zambia limited 
7. Jacma Enterprises  
8. Dochib Contractors  
9. Saloba Limited  
10. Sky Centre Enterprises 
11. Rigid Engine Reconditioning  
12. Crane Power Zambia Limited  
13. Ebsa Investments  
14. Wade Adams Piling and Foundations Zambia Ltd  
15. Dramoll Construction Company 
 
b) Other firms  
1. Afrope Zambia Limited  
2. Raphcon Industries Limited 
3. Nucco Industries Limited  
4. Morganite Zambia Limited  
5. Perway Industries Zambia Ltd  
 
c) Government  
1. Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development 
2. Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry  
 
NB: category A and B respondents were interviewed during the last week of November 2012 and 
second week of January 2013.  Category C respondents were interviewed in the second week of 
December 2012. To ease citation and uphold anonymity in this thesis, they have been quoted as 
(Field Data, 2013a); (Field Data, 2013b); and (Filed Data, 2013c) respectively. Where (Field Data, 
2013d) appears, it refers to direct observations during fieldwork.  
 
